International Models for Pension Reform by Mitchell, Olivia S
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council
1-1-1998
International Models for Pension Reform
Olivia S. Mitchell
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/525
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Mitchell, Olivia S., "International Models for Pension Reform" (1998). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 525.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/525
International Models for Pension Reform
Disciplines
Economics
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/525
International Models for Pension Reform
Olivia S. Mitchell
PRC WP 98-5
1998
Pension Research Council
3641 Locust Walk, 304 CPC
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
Tel: 215/898-0424 h Fax: 215/898-0310
http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/prc/prc.html
This working paper was presented at the Social Security Committee, House of Commons – Parliament,
London.
Pension Research Council Working Papers are intended to make research findings available to other
researchers in preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final
publication. Opinions are solely those of the authors.
© 1998 Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. All Rights
Reserved.
1International Models for Pension Reform
The share of the world’s population over age 60 will triple between 1990 and 2030.
By that date, more than 30% of the developed world’s people will be older than age
60.  This massive demographic shift will challenge public and private pension
systems the world over.  The reality is that many of  the large unfunded public
social security programs that evolved after World War II face threats of financial
insolvency.1 Can funded pension plans perform effectively as an alternative model
for national retirement systems?  In these remarks, I explore recent international
developments in pension plan type, examine issues pertinent to pension
investments, and evaluate the global trend toward social security privatization.
The goal of the discussion is to assess how these new pension models will respond to
the demographic, political, and financial challenges of the next century.2
The US Perspective: Defined Contribution Pensions Increasingly Popular
In the United States, retiring workers depend on three sources of wealth for their
old-age consumption: private savings, company-provided pensions, and government-
funded old-age benefits from the Social Security system.  Wealth holdings for a
representative sample of Americans on the verge of retirement appear in Table 1.3
                                                 
1 See Bodie, Mitchell and Turner (1996), and Fields and Mitchell (1993).
2 In this discussion I draw on my published and unpublished research including Mitchell (1998 and
1997d) and other items listed in the references.
3 This is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), covering people age 51-61 and their spouses of any
age, first surveyed in 1992 and reinterviewed every two years thereafter.  This project is described at
www.umich.edu/~hrswww/
2The data show that the median household whose head is in his mid-50’s commands
about US$325,000 in total assets, a sum projected to grow to $380,000 by the time
the household head attains age 62.  Of this total, about two-fifths is attributable to
expected future retirement payments from the government Social Security system.
Approximately one-fifth each is represented by housing wealth, other financial
assets, and the company-sponsored pension.
The importance of company pension plans has grown over time. In the US,
employers may voluntarily offer a pension if deemed useful for human resource
objectives;  it should be noted that providing a pension is not mandatory.4  Most
pensions paying benefits today were established in the 1940’s and 1950’s, and
pensions now cover approximately half of all people working in the private sector
(coverage in the public sector is much higher). It is estimated that about half of all
workers  will receive a pension benefit from an employer plan when they retire.
Deciding to supply a pension plan is voluntary, as is the choice over plan type and
the level of benefits or contributions (depending on the plan type).  A company that
does issue a pension promise is subject to extensively fiduciary legislation and
government oversight to ensure that contributions are made in a regular manner,
and that promised benefits are delivered.  Key among these legislative
requirements is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,
                                                 
4 For a discussion of factors influencing the demand for and supply of pensions see Gustman,
Mitchell and Steinmeier (1994).
3requiring a defined benefit pension to pre-fund its promises with assets held in
trust for the participant.  In a conventional defined benefit plan, the employer
specifies that he will pay the retiree a life annuity that depends on the worker’s pre-
retirement pay and years of service.  Pre-funding therefore requires computing the
present value of future benefits and depositing assets into a segregated account to
secure it.  Workers having a defined benefit promise are also covered by a
government-run pension insurance agency called the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation (PBGC), an institution that secures defined benefit promises, should
the sponsoring corporation default by virtue of bankruptcy.
Defined contribution pensions are not covered by this form of government insurance
in the US.  This second plan type includes the very popular 401(k) plans, are of
more recent vintage.  In these plans, a sponsoring company makes available to
workers an investment-type account into which employees may elect to contribute if
they should choose.  Typically employers will match up to a fraction of employee’s
deferred pay, thus boosting employee incentives to join the plan.
An overview of the US pension environment is provided in Table 2.  This shows that
defined benefit pensions are fewer in number than defined contribution plans, but
they control about half the total participant and asset pool.5  This picture is far from
static, since major changes have occurred in the pension environment in the past
4several decades.  For example Figure 1 reveals that asset holdings in both pension
types have grown substantially, but the rate of expansion has been much faster for
defined contribution than for defined benefit plans.  Likewise, the rate of growth in
participants for defined contribution plans has far exceeded that of defined benefit
plans.  In other words, though defined benefit plans remain major players in the US
retirement security arena, the greatest growth has been, and is likely to continue to
be, in the defined contribution side of the market.
Many have sought to explain why defined contribution pensions have grown so fast,
while virtually no new defined benefit plans are being initiated of late.  One
explanation has to do with rising expenses required to mount a defined benefit plan,
illustrated in Table 3.  Many of these costs are administrative in nature due to
record-keeping requirements, reporting and disclosure to the government, actuarial
fees associated with funding computations, and the expenses associated with the
mandatory pension insurance.  For a small plan, this per-participant cost is quite
substantial, at approximately $850 per year per employee (money management
costs are not included in these calculations).  Scale economies are important, so that
a larger company with at least 10,000 employees faces a per-participant cost of only
about $60 per year.  The cost disadvantage of defined benefit plans in the US
relative to defined contribution pensions is also important and the effect differs with
firm size.  Thus a small company would pay 116% more per year in administrative
                                                                                                                                                    
5 For more discussion of private pensions see Gordon, Mitchell and Twinney (1997).  The figures on
private pensions do not include public sector pension plans, which have approximately 16 million
5costs if it offered a defined benefit versus a defined contribution pension, and a
large employer would pay 39% more per year.  Clearly cost differentials can explain
some of the trend favoring defined contribution pensions over time.
Another reason that defined contribution pension are growing is that both
employers and employees like them.  These plans afford participants the
opportunity to select how much to invest in their  pension (up to a legal limit) and
how they will manage their own investments within the plan.  By law, the 401(k)
participant must have a choice of at least three funds to choose from (a stock index
fund, a bond fund, and usually a money market);  additional options are becoming
the norm as money managers offer alliances with fund families and a wide range of
institutional investors.  For example in my university pension plan I have more
than 30 funds across which I can allocate my pension dollars.  Employees who
decide to invest in their pension plans are often “rewarded” for participation with
an employer match for some of their contributions, anywhere from 20 to 100%.
Since the employer match vests only after 5 years, this tends to reward longer-
staying employees.  A typical sum invested into a 401(k) plan is currently about 6%
of pay, and about half of all offering companies match employee contributions at
some level.  Participation rates have risen quite dramatically in the last decade,
with over 75% of all eligible workers contributing something to their plans.
                                                                                                                                                    
participants and more than $1 trillion in assets; see Mitchell and Carr (1996).
6Several public policy questions loom large on the pension horizon in the US, some
specific to the 401(k) environment, while others are more general.  One issue is that
pension participants have increasingly been given access to their funds prior to
retirement, raising the question of whether this will erode eventual retirement
benefits.  For instance, 401(k) pensions typically offer loans in the event of
hardship, and lump-sum cash-outs are paid to people leaving the sponsoring firm.
Evidence suggests that most young people receiving a few thousand dollars do tend
to spend rather than roll the money into another tax-protected pension account.  A
related issue is that many defined benefit plans now allow vested workers to take a
lump-sum if they leave prior to retirement, a development that raises a similar
policy question.
A different policy concern is whether enough money is being put into pension
accounts in the first place.  Combined employee/employer contribution rates of 6% of
pay in 401(k) plans – to a limit of under $10,000 per year – cannot generate a very
large eventual retirement benefit, as compared to the old defined benefit pension
system where double that amount tended to be deposited by sponsoring employers.
Of course many of those who have 401(k) plans today would not have had any
pension if the defined benefit plan were the only model available. Therefore, for this
group, retirement saving is raised as a result of this new plan type.  In any event,
there is concern that people have focused too little on retirement saving needs in the
7US, and they are rarely aware of the implications of saving shortfalls for their
retirement wellbeing.
A further issue has to do with the way in which pension systems are designed and
governed, especially those defined benefit plans created by state and local
governments to provide retirement benefits to teachers, uniformed officers, and
other civil servants.6   These public pensions are managed differently than are
private plans, mainly because corporate pensions must meet fiduciary standards
codified in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), whereas public
plans are subject to less stringent and less uniform regulation.  As a result, public
plan governance has been subject to political pressure influencing funding decisions
and the choice of actuarial assumptions.  In particular, liability measures are often
sensitive to local fiscal stress, and investments are frequently subject to non-
financial criteria.   Also political appointees and ex officio board members tend to
dominate decision-making, frequently with many public pension directors chosen to
represent the interests of plan participants.  Perhaps because of this different
governance structure, public pension plans often direct their investments toward
“in-state” projects, a practice associated with diminished rates of investment return.
In general, though, public sector pensions in the US are relatively well funded,
partly because their asset allocations have changed dramatically over time:
currently over 40% of public plan assets are held in stock, up from 3% in 1960.
                                                 
6 See Mitchell and Carr (1997); Hsin and Mitchell (1994 and 1997); Mitchell and Hsin (1994 and
1997).
8A final area just beginning to engage public discussion concerns the payout or
decumulation phase of the pension system.  This has to do with retirement
annuities – insurance products that offer protection against the risk that someone
could outlive his saving.  These annuities are of utmost importance for older people
considering how to draw down their assets over the retirement period.    The
problem in the US is that retirees are increasingly offered the chance to access their
entire pension amount rather than being required to annuitize their benefits.  This
breakdown in the annuity market may produce increasing adverse selection, a
development that should be carefully monitored (Mitchell, Poterba, and
Warshawsky 1997).
Issues Regarding Pension Investment and Fiduciary Responsibility
Today’s workers – tomorrow’s retirees – clearly expect pensions to play a central
role in their retirement wellbeing.  Whether reality will meet expectations depends
in large part on how well the pension funds are invested.  It is for this reason that
policymakers have turned their attention to issues regarding pension investment
performance and matters of fiduciary responsibility.
These issues are perhaps clearest in the case of defined benefit pensions, since in
the US, corporate plan assets are managed by pension trustees rather than by
workers themselves.  Private pension trustees are financial fiduciaries, and under
9ERISA they must act as “prudent investors” – managing the monies in plan
participants’ best interests.  Though ERISA was legislated almost twenty-five years
ago, interpreting its so-called prudent man rule remains controversial – particularly
since trustees are held personally liable for investments found to be in conflict with
the principle.  In practice this debate translates into analysis of the most
appropriate benchmarks for evaluating investment performance in a defined benefit
environment.  Those who argue for efficient capital markets suggest that pension
money managers should not try to beat the market, but rather should invest
passively with indexed portfolios and low levels of annual turnover.  Opponents
point out that research and analysis pays off for less liquid holdings such as real
estate and global investment opportunities.  In any event, defined benefit plans
have substantially altered their investment holdings over time:  equity investments
have grown from 45% of the portfolio to 57%, and bonds grew from 27 to 33% (cash
and real estate fractions diminished; see Table 5).  Interest in international
holdings has also grown in the last half-dozen years, with non-US stock now at
around 10% of the private plan portfolio.
The defined contribution market is, however, not immune to all stress.  One thing
policymakers worry about is American workers’ financial illiteracy, particularly
given the fact that these workers are being asked to make sophisticated investment
decisions regarding their own pension holdings.  A discouraging finding is that
Americans tend to rely far too often on unsophisticated sources for financial advice
10
– friends and relatives – and lack a basic understanding of stock-market risk, bond
prices and returns, and simple compound interest.  More positively, however,
defined contribution participants have dramatically altered their asset allocations
in the last decade, moving increasingly into equities and away from guaranteed
insurance contracts (GICs; see Table 4).  This is particularly true of younger
workers who invest 70-80% of their 401(k) portfolios in equities, a strategy in
keeping with advice often offered by financial planners (Mitchell and Moore 1997).
Also employers offering defined contribution pensions have found that offering their
workers educational courses regarding financial preparedness for retirement raises
the likelihood that workers will join in the plan, and may influence their asset
allocation decisions (Mitchell and Scheiber, forthcoming).  This in turn raises
another concern, however, since parties offering financial advice in the US can be
subject to legal suits should the investments turn sour.  An important case on this
point is currently wending its way through the court system, where 401(k)
participants allege that their employer, a major computer systems manufacturer,
offered an investment option that later proved to be worth less than anticipated.
This case challenges many corporations’ assumptions that giving workers
investment options freed the sponsor from capital market risk in a defined
contribution pension.
Related to the topic of pension plan performance is the issue of plan efficiency, a
topic but little studied to date.   My research has found that public sector pension
11
plans operate at only 65% of potential efficiency, mainly because of the many small
funds that fail to take advantage of scale economies.7  Private sector defined
contribution plans in the United States are also asking how to invest more cost-
effectively, and expense ratios are coming under ever-closer scrutiny.   Variation in
administrative costs such as is depicted in Table 5 translates into different net
returns to investors, and as a result, there is increasing market pressure to reduce
fees.  A unique example is provided by the nation’s largest pension system, the
College Retirement Equity Fund (CREF), a plan that covers university staff and
faculty.  While that pension plan has several unique attributes – for instance it
receives special treatment under tax and insurance regulation – its cost structure is
among the lowest found in my recent review of pension costs (Table 6).  As a result,
some hail this national defined contribution structure as an example to replicate in
other industrial sectors.
Global Change in Pensions: Social Security Privatization
The US Old-age, Survivors, and Disability (OASDI) program – which pays social
security old-age benefits – faces an unfunded obligation of approximately $9 trillion.
Filling this gap will require a benefit cut of about 25%, or a tax increase of
approximately the same measure (Quinn and Mitchell 1996).  Either option would
have a serious impact on worker and retiree wellbeing, since even with current
promised benefit amounts, we estimate that the median older household faces a
saving shortfall of 16% per year (Moore and Mitchell 1997).   This represents the
                                                 
7 Evidence on this point appears in Hsin and Mitchell (1997), and Mitchell and Hsin (1997 a and b).
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additional saving needed above “automatic” asset appreciation, pension growth, and
social security benefit increases.  Since currently promised benefits cannot actually
be paid without substantial tax increases, we believe that the projected shortfall
potentially seriously understated.
As an alternative to raising taxes or cutting benefits, some have proposed a more
fundamental reform of the social security system – akin to that adopted by Chile in
1981.  What Chile did was take the dramatic step of restructuring its national social
security system, rejecting the old publicly-managed, deficit ridden, defined-benefit
pension system, and adopting instead a mostly privately-managed defined-
contribution pension design.  Its two-pillar model provides (1) a minimum pension
for retired workers, and (2) participation in mandatory defined contribution plans
managed by licensed private pension managers called AFPs (Asociacion de Fondos
de Pensiones).  The individual account plans are paid for from a mandatory payroll
tax set at 10% of pay (an additional 3% is charged for health and survivors
insurance, and administrative costs).
As an overall assessment, many would agree that the Chilean economy and its
pension system are in good economic shape today.  Pension privatization has been
judged a success, since the total fund  now amounts to about $40B and real returns
have been substantial (about 12% real per year) over the last decade and a half.  On
the other hand, critics argue that the Chilean program is inefficient – tax collection
13
costs are high and half of all participants switch from one fund to the next annually.
In addition the money managers have not diversified their holdings internationally,
raising questions about the system’s vulnerability to domestic market shocks.
In the last decade several sister countries in the Latin American region have
adopted variants on the Chilean model (see Table 7).8  Argentina’s reform differs
from Chile’s in that the former country maintained a large public pension benefit,
while also offering workers a one-time option to move part of their payroll taxes to a
funded defined contribution account.  Currently, the Argentine pension
accumulations are beginning to mount up, and early evidence suggests that the
majority of the eligible workforce is participating in the private accounts.
Administrative costs in Argentina are somewhat below those experienced in Chile,
partly because the Argentine approach employs the government tax collection
authority to collect funds.  Peru also implemented a private pension system, with
the difference that Peruvian workers have the option to continue to switch between
the new and the old system forever.  This will entail long-term duplication of
administrative costs as well as possible “gaming” of the minimum benefit via
optional contributions to each system through time.  A recent entrant to this arena
is Mexico, where a plan to mandate individual private pension accounts was
launched in late 1997, and somewhat unexpectedly, 10.5 million of 11 million
eligible workers signed up. Like Chile and all the other countries adopting the
                                                 
8 A discussion of the various Latin American reforms appears in Mitchell (1996b, 1997 a, b, and c),
and Mitchell and Barreto (forthcoming).
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mandatory defined contribution structure, the government continues to guarantee a
minimum retirement benefit to any worker whose pension fund is too small at
retirement.
Lest it be thought that the Chilean model is appealing only “south of the border”, we
note that the idea of a mandated, individual, defined contribution pension is
receiving serious study in the US as well. President Clinton’s Social Security
Advisory Council recently proposed three options for old-age benefit reform, two of
which had elements of an individual-account plan.9   Other influential groups
including the National Academy of Social Insurance and the Pension Research
Council have major studies on social security reform underway, including research
on the possible consequences of privatization in large nations with well-developed
capital markets.  Many of the former Soviet nations are actively discussing this
approach or have already adopted it, and even China has shown some interest.  It
seems fair to conclude that the defined contribution pension model has caught the
world’s imagination during this last decade of the 1990’s.
Looking Ahead
This is a time of substantial change and opportunity in the global retirement plan
arena, as economic and demographic challenges are met with new types of pensions
intended to help people enhance their retirement security.  Three factors promise to
15
influence retirement wealth accumulation and decumulation patterns in the future.
First, the movement away from defined benefit toward defined contribution plans
will continue, making job change and pension portability easier, but also placing
more responsibility on workers’ shoulders for retirement saving.  Second, greater
attention will have to be devoted to understanding the expenses associated with
different plan designs, and to implementing cost-cutting and efficiency measures.
Third, social security reforms will be required to force solvency on government
benefit programs currently facing imbalance. All of these developments imply that
individuals and their families will have to learn to save more, if they are to meet
retirement consumption targets.
The move to defined contribution pensions offers much promise and some risk.  In
my view, the most important positive effect of the mandatory defined contribution
model is that it reduces political risk.  Specifically, many people of working age
today do not believe that they will receive benefits from their soon-to-be insolvent
government-run defined benefit programs.  As a result, this uncertainty threatens
the system’s security and in turn compounds the uncertainty (Mitchell and Zeldes
1996).  A funded defined contribution approach, by contrast, reduces government’s
need to periodically change social security benefits and taxes, in response to
solvency pressures.
                                                                                                                                                    
9 The Advisory Council’s Final Report as well as that of the Technical Panel on Trends in Income and
Retirement Saving may be accessed via the  internet as follows:  http://www.ssa.gov  An alternative
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There are other factors that must also be attended to when evaluating the
movement to defined contribution plans.  Pension systems in the past had the great
virtue of being able to pool a variety of risks ranging from income loss due to
disability, economic insecurity due to longevity, and (sometimes) inflation.  As we
have shown, some of these risks are protected against in the Latin American two-
pillar structures described above – for instance, they provide some earnings
insurance due to the linkage between contributions and eventual benefits, and some
require mandatory annuitization at retirement.  These programs also afford a
degree of protection against poverty, due to their first-pillar minimum benefit.
On the other hand, some risks are not well pooled in a defined contribution pension
system.  For example, the worker losing his job due to skill obsolescence or injury
will see this pay cut reflected in his defined contribution pension contributions (and
eventual retirement benefits).   When the first-pillar minimum public pension is
raised to offer a larger “cushion” or safety net, this tends to result in evasion, lower
private saving, and reduces labor supply.  The fact that many Latin American
nations have restricted their country pension portfolios mainly to domestic assets
also makes these systems – and their participants – particularly vulnerable to
country-specific macroeconomic risk.   It seems likely that more international asset
diversification will become the norm in the next decade, particularly in countries
highly dependent on export markets.
                                                                                                                                                    
site is lexis.pop.upenn.edu/aging_html
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Irrespective of the model for pension reform that is chosen, thoughtful analysts
ultimately agree that that no pension system can protect against the risk of world-
wide shocks.  We believe that it is imperative for reformers to acknowledge this
risk, so as to more accurately represent to workers and retirees the potential for
variability in their future income streams. Only a realistic vision of what a
retirement system can provide will produce a pension system strong enough to
weather the demographic, political, and financial challenges of the next century.
18
Table 1:  Wealth Holdings of Older US Households by Wealth Decile
  Projected Projected
Wealth Current    Wealth at Wealth at
Decile Wealth         Age 62 Age 65
1  $     39,470  $   43,804  $   49,031
2         97,452     109,578     121,123
3       156,288     182,494     202,946
4       219,797     256,636     283,184
5       287,692     338,153     372,701
6       364,802     429,253     471,308
7       459,858     543,397     595,408
8       590,079     699,681     763,756
9       804,934     944,894  1,030,054
10    1,764,414  2,117,052  2,362,963
Full Sample
Mean       $478,313     $566,431     $625,066
  -Housing         65,940       76,410       80,507
  -Financial       175,974     205,653     228,133
  -Social Security       119,793     128,712     142,018
  -Pension       116,606     155,656     174,408
Median 10%       $325,157     $382,678     $420,537
  -Housing         59,746       71,097       75,047
  -Financial         66,530       71,004       71,175
  -Social Security       133,606     143,864     160,824
  -Pension         65,275       96,713     113,491
Source: Health and Retirement Study data; computations by Moore and Mitchell (1997)
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Table 2. Private Employer-Sponsored Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pensions
in the United States
         Total      DB plans         DC plans
Number of plans: 702,097      12%      87%
Number of participants:   83.9M       48% 52%
Assets:  $2.3B 54%      46%
Contributions received:  $154M 34%      66%
Benefits paid: $156M 51%      49%
(Source: Mitchell 1996a)
Table 3. Administrative Costs in Private US Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Pension Plans
I.  Annual Administrative Costs for a Corporate Defined Benefit Pension Plan:
$850/yr/participant for small plan (15 lives) versus
$56/yr/participant for large plan (10,000 lives)
II. The Defined Benefit/Defined Contribution Cost Ratio Has Risen Over Time:
Year Small Plan Large Plan
(15 lives) (10,000 lives)
1981   142%  91%
1996   216% 139%
Source: Mitchell and Scheiber (forthcoming)
Money management costs are excluded from these computations.
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Table 4. Assets by Plan Type: US Private Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Pensions
           Defined Benefit         Defined Contribution
Asset Category 1983    1996  1983 1996
Equity 45%      57%  27%      60%
Bonds 27 33  22 30
Other 28 10  51 10
Source: Mitchell (1996a)
Table 5. Mutual Fund Expense Ratios by Fund Type
(Funds with assets > given levels)
 Dollar Weighted Average Expense Ratio
Lowest Highest
Type of Fund Average Quartile Quartile
(%) (%) (%)
Equity Index (A>$100M) 0.324 0.150 1.640
Money Market (A>$1B) 0.613 0.150 1.000
Fixed Income (A>$1B) 0.876 0.280 2.000
Growth (A>$500M) 1.043 0.500 2.460
Growth & Income (A>$500M) 0.834 0.390 1.840
Balanced (A>$250M) 0.895 0.350 1.910
Global (A>$250M) 1.250 0.840 1.380
Source: Mitchell (1996a)
Expense ratio defined as fraction of assets devoted to fund administrative expenses annually.
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Table 6. College Retirement Equity Fund (CREF) Administrative Expenses
Total Investment Administrative Distribution
Expenses Advisory Fees Expenses Expenses
Type of Fund             (%) (%) (%) (%)
Equity Index 0.32 0.08 0.21 0.03
Stock Account 0.34 0.10 0.21 0.03
Growth 0.42 0.18 0.21 0.03
Global equities 0.41 0.17 0.21 0.03
Social choice 0.33 0.09 0.21 0.03
Money market 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.03
Bond market 0.30 0.06 0.21 0.03
Source: Mitchell (1996a)
22
Table 7: Key Features of Several Latin American Pension Reform Programs
Chile Peru Argentina Colombia Uruguay Mexico
Structure Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory
1st Pillar Public Public Public Public Public Public
2nd  Pillar Private Only Optional
Pub/Priv.
Optional
Pub/Priv.
Optional
Pub/Priv.
Optional
Pub/Priv.
Private
Only
Financing
   E’r payroll tax
   E’ee payroll tax
   Other Gen’l Rev.
0%
10%
Yes
0%
11% or 10%
Yes
0%
11% both
Yes
10%/7.5%
3.5% or 2.5%
Yes
NA/0%
NA/0%-7.5%
Yes
0%
6.5%
Yes
Benefits
Ret. Age (m/f)
   1st Pillar: %Pay
   2nd Pillar: Payout
65/60
25%
Lump-ProgWD-
Annuity
65
NA
ProgWD-
Annuity
65/60
28%
ProgWD-
Annuity
62/57
55%
ProgWD-
Annuity
60
NA
Annuity
65
40%
Annuity-
ProgWD
Regulatory
Structure
Fees Regul.
Int’l Invst. OK
Min. ROR Req.
           Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Transition Costs
% of GDP
Recog. Bond
100-80%
Yes
27%
Yes
NA
No
87%
Yes
NA
No
80%
No
Performance
Fund (US$)
Fund (%GDP)
Recent ROR (%)
AFP’s (No.)
Affiliates  (No.)
$28B
41% (‘94)
12.5% (‘82-95)
15
5.5M
$900M
1.5% (‘96)
15.5% (‘94-95)
6
1.5M
$4.5B
0.7% (‘95)
19.9%(‘95-96)
21
5.5M
$50M
NA
15.5% (‘96)
9
2.1M
$25.6M
NA
NA
6
0.5M
$3.9B
NA
NA
25
11.2M
Source: Mitchell (1997d) and Barreto and Mitchell (1997). NA signifies not available.  ProgWD signifies programmed
withdrawal. E’r signifies employer; E’ee means employee.
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Figure 1.   Asset Growth in US Private Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension
Plans over Time
24
Figure 2.   Participation in US Private Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension
Plans over Time
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